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ANYONE who hopes to find in a bookstore a book published three years ago
is an optimist. This is particularly true if he is looking for books on current
events. These seem to be written for the moment; they organize the substance
of current clich6s into a sequence of chapters; obtain, if their authors are
lucky, rapt reviews on the first page of the New York Times and New York
Herald Tribune book sections, and are deservedly forgotten within the year.
No wonder the editors of this Journal lost patience with this reviewer for
withholding a review of The Origins of Totalitarianism since 1951, when he
promised it. Editors, publishers, booksellers and reviewers alike are condi-
tioned to the publishing conveyor belt and find it difficult to cope with an
original book.
The usual book is easily reviewed. A neat summary and a few highlighted
points of dissent and consent lead to an airing of the reviewer's own opinions
on the subject of the book, if not on some other subject, and the review is
done. But to apply these easy directions to Hannah Arendt is a different
matter. This reviewer, at any rate, found it impossible to summarize a book
that has new, profound and original things to say about, among other things,
Jewish bankers, Proust, the Dreyfus Affair, Disraeli, Cecil Rhodes, the Union
of South Africa, the Viennese theatre under the Hapsburg monarchy, bu-
reaucracies in France, India, Czarist Russia, Soviet Russia and Germany, the
French Revolution, and the Treaty of Versailles, and that shows the bearing of
these on the concentration camps, wars, migrations and scandals of our con-
temporary world. He hesitates to agree or disagree with Hannah Arendt
by a deadline, but he does want to record in this Journal his opinion that
Hannah Arendt's book should be read by everybody and particularly by
lawyers, law students, and law professors.
The book should be read because it contributes more to the understanding
of the new and central problem of our age, totalitarianism, than any other
book published within a decade or so and because .that problem is understood
by far too few. The meaning of totalitarianism is obscured by a multitude of
false observations and analogies. Totalitarianism is being equated with every-
thing conceivable from the old-fashioned brands of tyranny to a disagreement
about the methods of one's favorite senator. Not so long ago it was fashion-
able to consider it an exclusive product of something sometimes called "the
German character" and sometimes "Prussian militarism," and now it seems
almost obligatory to consider it a monopoly of the Soviet Union. Hannah
Arendt demonstrates that totalitarianism is one, catholic, and unholy, that
its Hitlerian and its Stalinist branches were substantially identical and that
its attraction is powerful in most countries of Western culture. She analyzes
the texture of daily life under totalitarianism and the reasons for its perverse
seductiveness. "[T]he point about everyday life under totalitarian conditions
is that only the agents of the NKVD in an industrial enterprise are informed
of what Moscow wants when it orders, for instance, a speed-up in the fabrica-
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tion of pipes-whether it simply wants more pipes, or to ruin the director
of the factory, or to liquidate the whole management, or to abolish this par-
ticular factory, or, finally, to have this order repeated all over the nation
so that a new purge can begin."'1 Moreover "Moscow may not yet know,
when it gives its order for pipes, whether it wants pipes-which are always
needed-or a purge."12 "Simply because of their capacity to think, human
being are suspects by definition, and this suspicion cannot be diverted by ex-
emplary behavior, for the human capacity to think is also a capacity to change
one's mind. . . . Mutual suspicion, therefore, permeates all social relation-
ships in totalitarian countries and creates an all-pervasive atmosphere even
outside the special purview of the secret police." 3 "[W]here careers are
extremely insecure and where the most spectacular ascents and falls have
become everyday occurrences, every word becomes equivocal and subject to
retrospective 'interpretation'. '" 4 "[W]e do not know the extent of character
transformation under a totalitarian regime. We know even less how many of
the normal people around us would be willing to accept the totalitarian way
of life-that is, to pay the price of a considerably shorter life for the assured
fufillment of all their career dreams."3
Hannah Arendt thoroughly illuminates and documents the aspect of totali-
tarianism which normal people find hardest to understand: its irrational and
anti-utilitarian aspect, the aspect that misled Chamberlain in the thirties and
misleads the neutralists in Europe today. Concentration camps, for instance,
cannot be ex-plained as a convenient device for obtaining cheap labor. In Russia
all labor is slave labor in the old-fashioned sense, for no worker outside the
camps has any choice of movement or influence on his pay. Yet the camps
are deemed necessary, although in them the output of a worker has been
estimated to be 50 percent below that prevailing outside, and highly qualified
engineers compete for the right to do plumbing jobs, repair clocks, electric
lighting, and telephones in times of acute shortage of technical skill.6 "The
Nazis carried . . . uselessness to the point of open anti-utility when in the
midst of the war, despite the shortage of building material and rolling stock,
they set up enormous, costly extermination factories and transported millions
of people back and forth."'
7
The purposes of concentration camps are other than economic. They serve
as experiment stations of totalitarianism in its purest form, they serve as
training grounds for the secret police; they serve, by the rumors emanating
from them, to spread an all-pervading atmosphere of terror; and, most im-
portant of all, they serve as a main instrument for exterminating the concepts
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concepts that the concentration camps must contain not only enemies or
opponents of the regime but also groups selected at random. If they con-
tained only opponents, the camps would point an unequivocal way to marty-
dom that is possible only if there is a choice between good and evil. But "free
consent is as much an obstacle to total domination as free opposition,"8 for
free consent assumes the possibility of dissent, and hence it admits of indi-
vidual merit. The camps make martyrdom impossible for the first time in
history.
These are but a few quotations, ideas and paraphrases culled from only twenty-
nine out of 439 pages. Every one of them calls for reflection, for comment, for
further development; none of them can be fully understood removed from its
place in a carefully constructed argument rooted in painstaking research of
almost incredible scope.
Again, this book should be read; read by everyone who hates the spectre
of totalitarianism, and who senses that it needs to be fought outside the
political sphere as much, if not more, than within it. The few passages quoted,
which point to worship of success and surrender of spontaneity as invading
roads, as well as symptoms, of totalitarian infection, need to be read and
pondered in the climate of American life, and alongside such studies as Is
Anybody Listening? by Whyte and the Editors of Fortune.
In a law school no discussion of jurisprudence, of immigration law, of the
Bill of Rights, and of administrative law, should remain untouched by Hannah
Arendt. It is perhaps too much to hope, but it is worth hoping for, that
The Origins of Totalitarianism be present in the minds of our legislators
and statesmen as well.
No book of such originality and scope is without flaws. The Oriyins of
Totalitarianism could have been made more readable by disciplined editing.
As it is, it demands efforts from its readers; it baffles by sudden jumps and
short-cuts in its reasoning, and it may irritate some by repetition. In short,
it is not a well-written book, but neither was Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
And it may well be that analysis and reflection will find demonstrable errors
among the multitude of Miss Arendt's insights. For instance, it is doubtful
that her economic theories about the course of empire and colonialism, which
she traces to surplus wealth and surplus population, can be substantiated.
But this reviewer promises that those willing to overcome the difficulties
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